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Executive Summary 
 
This paper is an examination of the determinants of Family Support employee 
allocation. Specifically, related to Kentucky, the goal of this research is to determine if public 
assistance caseloads are equitable across nine geographic regions. A review of relevant 
literature provides a larger context to this topic. Literature primarily suggests three mechanisms 
by which Family Support resources might be allocated: legal regulations, postcode lottery, and 
Tiebout migration.  
Supported by literature the larger context for this paper leads to the examination of five 
independent variables: (1) percent of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program recipients \, 
(2) total population, (3) percent of the population over 65, (4) percent population identified as 
white, and (5) percent below poverty. The dependent variable for this study is the number of 
Family Support personnel per region.  Since the dependent variable was reported on a regional 
level an adjustment to the independent variable data.  Level f aggregations of the 720 panel 
observations for the independent variables were collapsed into a regional level of 54 
observations. The remaining 54 observations were then subjected to both fixed-effects and 
between effects regression analyses.  
The output of these analyses suggests that Family Support personnel were allocated to 
each region in a uniform standard. However, the primary factors in this allocation were more 
related to demographic variables than to the number of public assistance recipients. This 
means that the variation of Family Support personnel between the regions has a discriminatory 
effect as regions with younger populations will receive fewer resources.  
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I. Introduction 
The Kentucky Department for Community Based Services (DCBS) encompasses two 
divisions: (1) Family Support and (2) Protection/Permanency. Adult and child protective services 
programs are administered by Protection/Permanency. Family Support is charged with 
determining eligibility for all entitlement programs administered by the DCBS, such as 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicaid and the Kentucky Transitional 
Assistance Program (K-TAP).  
With annual expenditures of more than $1 billion,1 DCBS is facing increased scrutiny of 
its resource allocation.  Recently, Kentucky-based news agencies have attempted to draw a 
causal link between the number of child abuse deaths and the allocation of 
Protection/Permanency personnel. The investigative reports by the local news pushed the 
Kentucky legislature to create a special investigative committee to review child abuse deaths. 
Currently, the scope of this legislative investigation is limited to Protection/Permanency. The 
question this author attempts to answer is if DCBS is mismanaging one division is there also 
mismanagement of Family Support? The purpose of this paper is to examine the allocation of 
personnel within the division of Family Support personnel allocation to see if this resource has 
been allocated proportionally to caseloads.  
At present, Family Support has at least one office in each of Kentucky’s 120 counties. In 
total, Family Support has 1,822 employees to allocate across the state. However, even a cursory 
review of Family Support office locations suggests that the number of offices does not coincide 
                                                          
1
 Kentucky’s Transparency Portal, Spending Search. http://opendoor.ky.gov/search/Pages/spendingsearch.aspx. 
accessed 4/7/14. 
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with population density. For instance, Fayette County (pop. 305,489) has one office, Jefferson 
County has eight (pop. 750,828), and Bell County (pop. 28,183) has two.  
Family Support strives to allocate personnel in a uniform manner and has developed a 
case-weight system to compare worker productivity.2 A case-weight system is needed because 
Family Support cross-trains its employees, meaning that the same employee may process SNAP 
and Medicaid applications on the same day. The DCBS Commissioner’s Office has assigned 
different weights to each application type, ranging from 0.5 to 5.0.  These numbers were 
originally based on the average number of hours needed to process the corresponding type of 
application. For instance, a SNAP application is given a weight of 2.0 while a K-TAP case is 
weighted at 2.5. These weights give administrators the ability to measure individual 
productivity and ensure a uniform caseload statewide.  
Equity of caseloads is important for Family Support because inequitable caseloads have 
been tied to lower employee retention rates (Barbee, 2011).  Kentucky’s FY 2012 – 2014 budget 
exempted Family Support from budget cuts because caseloads had increased 30 percent since 
2007. During the research process of this paper, the author spoke with a director-level Family 
Support employee who said, “We don’t really go by the case weights anymore…there’s not 
really a system for who get[s] what. The regional staff keep[s] records on who works where.”3 
This admission of potential mismanagement and shifting economic conditions anecdotally 
suggests that Family Support personnel may not be allocated uniformly.  
                                                          
2
 Division of Family Support Operations Manual, Vol.1 Sec. 0080 
http://manuals.chfs.ky.gov/dcbs_manuals/DFS/VOLI/OMVOLI.pdf accessed 4/7/14. 
3
 Eldridge, Donna. Interview. February 2014 
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The following analysis will focus on measuring the relationship between the number of 
Family Support caseworkers and their caseloads. The goal of measuring this relationship is to 
find which determinants affect Family Support personnel allocation. Section II is a review of 
literature on public assistance caseloads, and section III is an overview of the research design 
used in this study.  Section IV contains the results of the research design. Section V is a 
collection of the conclusions, limitations and future research.  
 
II. Literature Review 
Questions about the effectiveness of public assistance programs in the United States 
have inspired a large amount of literature. Most literature is focused on the economic impacts 
of these programs and the corresponding budgetary implications. Within this broad scope of 
public assistance, many theories examine the impacts of social service allocation. This study 
examines three theories that may explain Family Support personnel allocation: (1) legal 
analysis, (2) postcode lottery and (3) Tiebout migration.  
 
Legal Analysis 
Legal analysis suggests that the allocation of employees across regions follows the rules 
and standards set out in stautes and regulations. Located within Kentucky’s Executive Brach, 
the Division of Family Support is an extension of the Department for Community Based 
Services. Its authorizing legal framework includes guidelines for the provision of public 
assistance benefits. One of the implications of these guidelines for Family Support caseloads is 
that the services must not be provided in a discriminatory manner. For instance, if there are 
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inequitable caseloads, these must not be to the detriment of protected classes of beneficiaries. 
To do such would be a type of discrimination that Kentucky Courts have rejected.  
This situation previously occurred in Kentucky when the Supreme Court ruled in Rose v. 
Council (1989) that disparate funding allocations to rural and urban schools were a violation of 
state law (Hoyt, N.D.).4  The ruling also resulted in Kentucky’s education reforms of the 1990s.  
Maintaining equitable Family Support caseloads avoids discrimination and potential illegality 
(based upon previous precedent), which is an acknowledgement of the role U.S. Courts can 
have in public assistance administration.  
 
Postcode Lottery  
 In many settings, the allocation of social services between localities differs from what 
would be expected by legal analysis. In British studies, such unwarranted geographic variation is 
often referred to as postcode lottery (Cummins, 2007). The term does not imply intent or 
ignorance but is simply the result of non-uniform resource allocation. Postcode lotteries of 
public services are often caused by resource allocations that do not take into account the full 
complexities of populations. This means that resources were allocated according to a simple 
formula that would not take into account additional demographic variables that influence 
resource consumption.  
Public assistance resources allocated without consideration of demographic and cultural 
variables are likely to create postcode lotteries.  Demographic and cultural variables can affect 
                                                          
4
 Supreme Court Justices in Kentucky are politically elected, so it is possible that even though the underpinnings of 
case logic are the same, there could be a different decision if Rose v. Council were retried. Funding mechanisms for 
K-12 public education in Kentucky include a mixture of local funds. Family Support is entirely funded through the 
Kentucky’s general fund so this could alter the statutory underpinnings of the majority decision in Rose v. Council.  
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both public assistance eligibility and the participation rates of public assistance. For instance, 
non-white Medicaid applicants are more likely to be misinformed about benefit eligibility 
(Bradley, 2005). Single-parent households are also disproportionately eligible for public 
assistance benefits (Ayala, 2005). Minority and parental status are not the only demographic 
variables that affect public assistance participation. They are, however, an example of how 
demographic and cultural characteristics vary across geographic areas and can influence 
demand for public assistance programs.   
While postcode lottery is typically a European term, there is anecdotal evidence that 
suggests Family Support resources are allocated in inequitable concentrations. Literature often 
focuses on the individual impact of postcode lotteries. However, agencies, like individuals, are 
affected by postcode lotteries. Previous studies have attempted to determine why the 
retention rate among Family Support employees is lower than other peer organizations. The 
taxpayer cost to replace one Family Support caseworker is between $15,000 and $19,000 
(Barbee, 2011 and Yankeelov, 2009).  What these studies found was that there is a significant 
difference in Family Support retention rates geographically. The root cause of the disparate 
retention rates was assigned to inequitable caseloads between rural and urban Family Support 
offices.  
 
Tiebout Migration 
 The idea of a postcode lottery is that the best government services are received mainly 
by chance. Another possibility is that the American belief in free markets has created an 
economy where residents will choose to live in a community that maximizes their utility. In 
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other words, Americans are content with inequitable distribution of government services 
because the inequity gives citizens a choice. This conscious choice to relocate in order to 
receive the level of government benefits desired (and thus taxes paid) is known as Tiebout 
migration (Tiebout, 1956).  While there is no consensus on this issue, several studies have 
shown that there are causal links between interstate migration and level of public assistance 
benefits available (Cebula, 2013 and Hsing, 1995).  For instance, Hsing found that states can 
expect a 0.40 percent increase in immigration for each one-percent increase in public 
assistance benefits. In 1992, California enacted a law to restrict public assistance benefits for 
new residents as legislators believed that California’s more generous social service programs 
were attracting immigration to the state. This law was later struck down by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Sáenz v. Roe (Sáenz, 1999). 
Within Kentucky, there is no regional or local monetary difference in public assistance 
benefits offered. However, there are measurable differences between counties and cities as far 
as tax accessed on wages, property and businesses. In tandem with the quality of Family 
Support services available, it is possible that there is a Tiebout migration of individuals within 
Kentucky.  Clients who are serviced by overburdened caseworkers are more likely to encounter 
errors with their applications. Kentucky is unable to provide an accurate estimate of the 
economic impact application errors have on public assistance programs (LRC, 2004).  Without 
an accurate estimate, it is unknown what percentage of type of processing errors, by 
overburdened caseworkers is in the client’s favor.  Clients who are serviced by overburdened 
caseworkers and who marginally qualify for programs are also more likely not to enroll as they 
face an artificial administrative burden (Moynihan, 2013). Therefore, a public assistance-eligible 
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individual could maximize their utility by relocating to an area with greater Family Support 
resources. Previous studies have indicated that there is no geographic pattern to tax effort by 
Kentucky localities, so it is possible that individuals could maximize their utility by moving a 
relatively minor distance (Hoyt, N.D.).  
Within the framework of Tiebout migration, potential inequity of Family Support 
caseloads could be economically ideal to Kentucky residents. However, the legality of such a 
conscious inequity in caseloads is questionable under the previous precedents set by the 
Kentucky Supreme Court. In sum, the legal analysis suggests that public assistance caseloads 
should be uniform in nature.  However, if there is caseload inequity the theories of postcode 
lotteries and Tiebout migration could explain potential determinants of Family Support 
caseload.  This study creates a research design, based upon the literature review, to find the 
determinants of Family Support personnel allocation.  
 
III. Research Design 
To determine if Family Support caseloads are equitable, the first task is to determine a 
good measurement of personnel allocation if legal the analysis was correct. The first 
independent variables selected for this study were region population and the percent of SNAP 
recipients.  Percent of SNAP recipients is simply the number of SNAP enrollees divided by the 
total region population. This measure was chosen as it directly contributes to the size of Family 
Support caseloads.   
The literature in section II suggests that postcode lottery or Tiebout migration also could 
influence the size of Family Support caseloads. To test the possibility of Tiebout migration and 
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related economic conditions, percent below poverty was added as an independent variable. 
The rationale behind this selection is that the individuals who vote with their feet and move to 
an area with better public-assistance service are most likely to be the recipients of such service. 
A good indicator of possible eligibility for public assistance is the percent below poverty. 
Tiebout migration could be present if caseloads are more responsive the clustering of poverty.  
Last, two other variables were selected to help determine if caseloads are proportional 
to the demographics of their corresponding communities or if there is the possibility of a 
postcode lottery. Those two variables are the percent of population over the age of 65 and the 
percent of white population.  Senior and minority populations receive public assistance at 
higher proportions than other segments of society so these variables could show if caseloads 
are allocated according to census data.  
The null hypothesis (H0) for this study is that the legal analysis is validated and none of 
the independent variables representing Tiebout migration or a postcode lottery (percent over 
65, percent white and percent below poverty) affects the number of Family Support personnel. 
The alternative hypothesis (HA) is that either Tiebout migration or a postcode lottery has the 
largest effect on the number of Family Support personnel. Prior to this analysis, I expected to 
accept the null hypothesis given the legal analysis and the presence of Family Support’s case-
weight system. 
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Dependent Variable 
The first course of action when collecting data for this study was to focus on the 
dependent variable: the number of Family Support employees per region. Currently, the 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) only publishes the number of CHFS employees in 
each county.  In January 2014, I sent a formal open records request to the DCBS Commissioner, 
Teresa James, for the number of Family Support personnel by county. The open records request 
was approved, and six years of data was released: 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013.  All 
six years of the data were used for this study; however, there are several issues in the reporting 
that needed to be addressed. First, the employee data that DCBS keeps is only on a regional 
level and not on a county level. DCBS has nine geographic regions within Kentucky, and each 
region is allowed to allocate personnel according to its individual needs. The Commissioner’s 
Office does not keep track of where Family Support employees are assigned once a region is 
given permission to fill a position. In the analysis, I match the regional reporting of the 
dependent variable by aggregating the independent variables into a regional level as well. 
The second concern regarding the dependent variable is the missing years of data. DCBS 
is unable to give employee numbers pre-2006 because that data was stored on its previous 
human resources software and was not imported into the new program. According to DCBS, 
data for 2010 and 2011 also is not available, but there is no explanation for why this data was 
lost. The data pre-2006 should not affect this study because DCBS was created in 2004. Data 
before this time period is simply nonexistent. The missing 2010 and 2011 data is not expected 
to contain any unpredictable variation in personnel allocation. There were no budgeted 
changes to the level of staff in these years. The 2012 Commonwealth budget allocated an 
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additional 300 personnel to DCBS.5 The 2012 and 2013 data will show how this increase in 
personnel was allocated. 
The final concern with the dependent variable data is that the data was compiled by 
DCBS in inconsistent time periods. Data for 2006 and 2007 reflect the employee totals for 
November of those respective years. 2008 and 2012 data were compiled in October of those 
years. 2009 was collected in May, and 2013 was collected in December. Family Support does 
not have seasonal employment or temporary employees. Each reported position is a full-time 
position, so it is unlikely that the inconsistent measurement would influence the data by way of 
a hiring cycle. As such, the inconsistent measurements should not alter the reliability of the 
data more than a marginal amount.  
This trio of dependent variable data issues (regional level, missing years and inconsistent 
definitions) gives concern that DCBS is not equipped to effectively manage Family Support. 
However, the aforementioned adjustments were made before the data were organized into the 
panel dataset. There are 54 observations of Family Support personnel in the panel dataset (9 
regions by 6 years). Included in this dataset are five independent variables. Each independent 
variable was aggregated from county-level data to match the regional nature of the dependent 
variable. The aggregation was completed by taking the means of county-level and data then 
adding a weight for county population. This gives the county-level data the effect of 
proportional representation within the regional aggregation. Last, the independent variables 
                                                          
5 Additional money was also allocated in 2013 and 2014 to hire more Family Support staff. The executive budget 
for these years states that, “caseloads in Family Support which have increased by over 30 percent since 2007. This 
investment will fund additional front-line benefit workers, reducing caseloads by approximately 14 percent over 
the biennium in the areas of Medicaid Eligibility, State Supplementation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps).” http://www.osbd.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/28C22F94-
8799-47C4-9627-3CF8B40C388F/0/1214ExecBudBudInBrief.pdf 
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measured in the number of persons were converted into percentages of the regional 
population. This final step was taken as regions are geographic in nature and do not have equal 
populations. For example, the Southern Bluegrass (pop. 593,966) region which includes 
Lexington, Ky., has 207 Family Support employees, compared to the Eastern Mountain region 
(pop. 265,008) which has 202 Family Support Employees. The percentage nature of the 
demographic data allows for an easier analysis of the results to come. 
 
Independent Variables 
Given the literature review which concludes that caseloads should legally be equal, the 
first two independent variables collected were region population and the percent of SNAP 
recipients per region. The total number of residents in a region will affect the anticipated 
number of potential public-assistance eligible persons and serves as a baseline for the other 
four independent variables. The second variable is the total number of individuals who receive 
SNAP benefits as reported by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, divided by the total 
population of the corresponding region. The percent of SNAP recipients is relevant to the 
dependent variable because it directly shows how many applications Family Support employees 
are processing within a region. While Family Support employees also process Medicaid and K-
TAP applications, these measures were not used as independent variables because of 
collinearity between the three programs. For instance, the correlation between SNAP and 
Medicaid was calculated in STATA to be 0.97. Between the public assistance programs, the 
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percentage of SNAP recipients per region was chosen as the independent variable because it is 
the most representative measure of Family Support caseloads. 6  
The third independent variable is the percent of population over the age of 65. This 
group, along with the fourth variable (percent of white individuals), was collected in order to 
control for demographic differences between the regions. Additionally, it has been established 
that there are knowledge gaps between age and ethnic groups in terms of public assistance 
programs (Moynihan, 2013). The percent over the age of 65 and the percent of white 
individuals will test for the existence of a postcode lottery by way of demographic inequities. 
The data for both variables were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control. Before this 
study, it was expected that the percent of individuals over the age of 65 would have a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable as seniors can qualify for additional Medicaid 
programs. The percent of white individuals did not have an expected relationship because of its 
relationship to overall population and to the number of minorities present.  
The last variable gathered for this study is the percent below poverty. This variable was 
selected to help control for macroeconomic conditions that affect the number of public 
assistance recipients. The data were also gathered from the Cabinet for Health and Family 
Services. Percent below poverty is expected to have a positive relationship to the dependent 
                                                          
6 The variance infatuation factor was calculated in STATA and produced the following results. Medicaid, 605; SNAP, 
323; KTAP, 62. Since the collinearity between the three programs is so high the numbers of Medicaid and 
K-TAP recipients were not selected as independent variables.  The number of Medicaid recipients is not 
as good a measure as SNAP recipients because Kentucky is a 1634 SSI state, which means that 201,195 
of the current 829,826 Medicaid beneficiaries do not interface with Family Support to receive Medicaid.  
(KY DMS, 2014) Instead, they receive Medicaid automatically when Social Security establishes SSI 
eligibility. Additionally, K-TAP primarily services urban recipients, so these two variables have more 
potential to alter the results of this study as compared with the number of SNAP recipients.  
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variable as it correlated to the number of individuals potentially eligible for public assistance.7  
Table 1 summarizes all the variables with their abbreviations from the model, description, 
expected sign and source.  
 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
 
Name Description Ex. Sign Source 
Dependent Variable 
CHFSEmployees 
Number of Family Support 
Employees (per region) 
N/A DCBS Open Records 
Independent Variable 
PercentSNAP 
Percent of SNAP Recipients (per 
region) 
(+) http://chfs.ky.gov 
Population Population (per region) (+) http://chfs.ky.gov/dms 
PercentOver 
Percent Over the Age of 65 (per 
region) 
(+) http://wonder.cdc.gov 
PercentWhite 
Percent Identified as White (per 
region) 
( - / + ) http://wonder.cdc.gov 
PercentBelowPoverty Percent Below Poverty (per region) (+) http://chfs.ky.gov 
Exp. Sign = Expected Sign 
   (+) = positive effect 
   (-) = negative effect 
   N/A = not applicable 
     
 
Research Models 
The nature of the panel dataset used for this study is that it observes the same 
dependent variable across time. The sample size of this analysis is the number of Family 
Support regions, 9, times the number of years observed, 6, for a total of 54 observations. The 
dependent variable is defined as the number of Family Support personnel per region. As 
previously stated, the independent variables were aggregated from county-level data into 
                                                          
7
 Additional independent variables were analyzed but not included in this analysis because they were co-linear 
with the existing variables. These omitted variables include the percent of K-TAP recipients, percent of Medicaid 
recipients, average household income, unemployment rate, and square miles of each region.  
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regional level in order to match the sample size of the dependent variable.  The Family Support 
regions are geographically oriented, and a simple mean would have distorted the results of 
each region as there are often urban and rural counties in the same observation.  So, a 
weighted-average aggregation proportional to county population was completed in STATA. This 
weighted average gives the aggregated regional data proportional representation within the 
panel dataset.  
 
Fixed-Effects Model 
Since the panel dataset consists of six years, two regression models were used for this study: 
fixed-effects and between-effects. The first model selected was the fixed-effects which hold 
constant the observed and unobserved characteristics of each region. Fixed-effects are used 
when attempting to measure time-series information. The benefit of this approach is that it 
reduces the possibility of omitted variable bias that could otherwise be present in a simple 
ordinary least squares regression. The equation for this fixed-effects model is as follows: 
Yr = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + αr + ε 
Yr represents the number of Family Support personnel allocated to an individual region. X1 – X6 
represents the six independent variables (region population, percent SNAP, percent over 65, 
percent white, and percent below poverty). αr represents the fixed effects for each region while 
ε is the random error of variables not included in the model. Below, in table 2, the summary 
statistics of the independent variables are listed for this fixed-effects model.   
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev Min  Max 
Number of Family Support 
Employees (per region) 
54         182.5            41.1          119.0          292.0  
Total Population (per 
region) 
54 
 
107,883.7  
 
218,991.8  
   
18,237.4  
 
750,828.0  
Percent of SNAP Recipients 
(per region) 
54           18.2              6.8              9.4            34.9  
Percent of Population Over 
the age of 65 (per region) 
54           13.5              1.4            11.1            16.3  
Percent of Population 
Identified as White (per 
region) 
54           90.1              6.9            71.4            97.7  
Percent Below Poverty (per 
region) 
54           19.7              5.8            11.5            32.3  
Obs = Number of Observations 
     St. Dev = Standard Deviation 
      
Between-Effects Model 
A between-effects model also was used for this study to measure the cross-sectional effects of 
the independent variables. Where fixed-effects measure the variation over time within the 
regions, between-effects measure the variation across the regions. Since this model uses the 
same panel dataset as the fixed-effects, the summary statistics are the same as presented 
earlier in table 2.  
 
IV. Results 
The results of both models indicate that three of the independent variables will have a 
measurable impact on the number of Family Support employees in a region. First, the results of 
the fixed-effects model are presented in Table 3. From this model, it can be concluded that the 
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distribution of Family Support employees is not equitable across the state. This will be further 
explained after Table 4.  
Table 3. Fixed-Effects Results 
Variables 
Total Family Support 
Employees per Region 
Coefficient Standard Error 
Total Population (1000s) 0.638* 0.3702 
Percent of SNAP Recipients  -8.862*** 2.265 
Percent of Population Over the 
age of 65  37.963*** 9.213 
Percent of Population Identified as 
White  -7.412*** 1.816 
Percent Below Poverty  0.003 1.100 
Constant 423.151 189.399 
Observations = 54 
R-Squared = 0.51 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4. Between-Effects Results 
Variables 
Total Family Support 
Employees per Region 
Coefficient Standard Error 
Total Population (1000s) -0.0686 0.291 
Percent of SNAP Recipients  12.366 24.957 
Percent of Population Over the 
age of 65  -1.574 14.262 
Percent of Population Identified as 
White  -4.562 8.780 
Percent Below Poverty  -7.65E+00 2.56E+01 
Constant 545.818 955.259 
Observations = 54 
R-Squared = 0.04 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 4, above, contains the results of the between-effects model. None of the variables 
in this model has a p-value less than .05. However, this is not surprising as the regional nature 
of the data has reduced the total number of observations. The lack of statistically significant 
findings in the between-effects model contrasts with the results in Table 3.  
 In Table 3, the percent of SNAP recipients has a negative effect on the number of Family 
Support employees at the 0.01 level. With each one-percent increase in the number of SNAP 
recipients, the number of Family Support employees decreases by -8.86. This is opposite of the 
earlier prediction of a positive relationship.  
Another prediction proven wrong by these results is the relationship of caseworkers and 
the percent of the white population. The previous prediction was that there would be no 
relationship. Instead, the results show that a one-percent increase in the number of white 
individuals decreases the number of Family Support employees -7.41. This is interesting 
especially when compared to the region population which has a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable. However, the region population does not have statistical significance 
below the 0.05 level.  
The next statistically significant variable was the percent of population over the age of 
65. The fixed effects model shows that a one-percent increase in the senior population has an 
increase of 37.96 Family Support employees at the 0.01 level. Last, the percent below poverty 
did not have statistical significance in either model. This variable has a positive relationship as 
predicted but is not a reliable measure of Family Support employee allocation.  Since three of 
the five independent variables in the fixed-effects model have statistical significance at the 0.05 
level or less, the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected.  
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Interpretation of Results 
 Having determined that the null hypothesis (H0) can be rejected, the threat of 
committing a type I error is not significant based on the results presented in Table 3. The main 
question of this study is if Family Support employees have been allocated equitably according 
to a legal analysis. The coefficients of the fixed-effects model provide the answer to that 
question. Four of the variables are quantified as a measure of population. Within this group, 
the percent of population over the age of 65 has the largest effect on the number of Family 
Support employees with a coefficient of 37.96.   The fixed-effects suggest that a region will have 
more family support workers when it has an increasing number of seniors.  
The results show that neither the legal analysis, postcode lottery, or Tiebout migration 
can explain inequity in Family Support caseloads. The postcode-lottery theory is rejected as the 
between-effects model was not able to produce any statistically significant results. Had the 
between-effects model produced significant results the conclusion would have been made that 
caseload inequity is a response to demographic clustering. However, this is not the case. The 
statistically insignificant results in the between-effects model suggest that none of the five 
independent variables has a cross-sectional effect on Family Support allocation. In other words, 
Family Support personnel allocation has changed more over time. This time series change is 
partly because of the 300 extra Family Support workers that were hired in the Commonwealth’s 
last budget cycle and general shifts in the population. 
Both the fixed-effects and between-effects models also do not provide sufficient 
evidence to conclude that Tiebout migration is responsible for caseload inequity. The variable 
percent below poverty was selected as the measure of this theory and does not have 
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significance in either model. If Tiebout migration had explanatory power it would be more 
logical that Family Support employee allocation would be more responsive to the percent 
below poverty.    
 Without the ability to explain caseload inequity by way of a postcode lottery or Tiebout 
migration, the author concludes that the legal analysis still remains the principled way to 
allocate Family Support personnel.  This means that the variation of Family Support personnel 
between the regions is age discriminatory as the variation in caseloads is more responsive to 
the percent of population over the age of 65 than to other explanatory variables. While age is a 
qualifying factor for Medicaid, seniors do not represent a disproportionate share of Medicaid 
applications. The latest count shows that individuals over the age of 65 represent only 9.9 
percent of Kentucky Medicaid beneficiaries (KY DMS, 2014).  Yet, according to data collected for 
this study, seniors represent 14.1 percent of Kentucky’s population. Therefore, Family Support 
caseloads are age discriminatory.  
 
V. Summary 
With an F-value of the fixed-effects model of <0.01, it is the opinion of the author that 
this study has found a statistical relationship between the number of seniors and the allocation 
of Family Support personnel.  After an analysis of the empirical results and relevant literature, 
this study reaches the conclusion that Family Support employees are not allocated equitably. 
However, even though the results and conclusions of this study have descriptive power, there 
are limitations to this conclusion. First, the reliability of the dependent variable data is 
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questionable as previously outlined in section III.  A more disaggregated collection of variables 
on the county level could provide more results or more accurate conclusions.  
 Second, there are other variables not included in this model that could potentially 
explain the difference in Family Support employee allocation. The fixed-effects model has an r-
squared value of 0.51. Footnote four explains which other variables were tested but not 
included in either model. Further research could develop a more comprehensive panel dataset 
that would achieve a higher r-squared value.  
 Last, the results of this paper are not generalizable outside of Kentucky. The economic 
and population data used in this study is unique to Kentucky and would not reflect an accurate 
analysis of other departments. The dependent variable data supplied by DCBS also is not 
relevant to other states as other states have different program eligibility requirements, 
application processes and bureaucratic structures that make their public assistance 
departments unique.  
 
Future Research 
 The focus of this research has been the allocation of Family Support personnel for the 
years 2006 – 2013. Beginning January 1, 2014, Kentucky opted to expand Medicaid eligibility 
under the Affordable Care Act. In preparing for this expansion, Kentucky introduced a new 
Family Support call center, online application process and a re-alignment of Family Support 
offices. While this study could help guide the current re-alignment of Family Support 
employees, future research may find this study increasingly to be obsolete. However, given the 
24 
 
current findings of employee inequity, future research is encouraged in order to ensure 
continuous accountability of Family Support resources. 
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Data Sources 
 
Division of Family Support Employees 
The number of Division of Family Support Employees was obtained through an open 
records request submitted on January 22, 2014 to Commissioner Teresa James. Dorcas 
Peach, Human Resource Branch Manager provided the data sets for 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2012 & 2013.  
 
Population (2006 – 2013) 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book. 
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014. 
  
SNAP Recipients (2006 – 2013) 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book. 
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
K-TAP Recipients (2006 – 2013) 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book. 
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
Medicaid Recipients (2006 – 2013) 
Department for Medicaid Services. MS 264 Report and Supplements. 
http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/stats.htm Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
Population Below Poverty (2006 – 2013) 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book. 
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
Population Unemployed (2006 – 2013) 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book. 
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
Population (Caucasian) 2006 – 2013 
Center for Disease Control. Bridged-Race Population Estimates. 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/Bridged-Race-v2012.HTML Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
Population (Age 65 and Over) 2006 – 2013 
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Center for Disease Control. Bridged-Race Population Estimates. 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/Bridged-Race-v2012.HTML Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
Average Household Income (2006 – 2013) 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book. 
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014. 
 
Square Miles (2006 – 2013) 
United States Census Bureau. State and County QuickFacts. 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html Accessed March 7, 2014.  
This measure is the land area in square miles, 2010.  
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Appendix 
 
A. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables   
 
Fixed-Effects Model 
Y Coef. Err. 
T-
stat 
P-
value 95% Conf. Int. 
Population 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.10 0.00 0.00 
PercentSNAP -8.86 2.27 -3.91 0.00 -13.48 -4.24 
PercentOver 37.96 9.21 4.12 0.00 19.17 56.75 
Percent White -7.41 1.82 -4.08 0.00 -11.12 -3.71 
PercentBelowPoverty 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.99 -2.85 2.86 
Constant 423.15 189.40 2.23 0.03 36.87 809.43 
       Between-Effects Model 
Y Coef. Err. 
T-
stat 
P-
value 95% Conf. Int. 
Population 0.00 0.00 -0.24 0.83 0.00 0.00 
PercentSNAP 12.37 24.96 0.50 0.65 -67.06 91.79 
PercentOver -1.57 14.26 -0.11 0.92 -46.96 43.81 
Percent White -4.56 8.78 -0.52 0.64 -32.50 23.38 
PercentBelowPoverty -7.65 25.60 -0.30 0.78 89.13 73.82 
Constant 545.82 955.26 0.57 0.61 -2494.24 3585.88 
 
Coef = coefficient 
Err = Robust Standard Error 
T-stat = t-statistic 
95% Conf. Int. = 95% Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
